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Archive: 2015

Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle 4: Attacks Over Cellular Network

Having described a proof of concept regarding vehicle attacks over Wi-Fi, Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek move on to the cellular exploitation scenario. Charlie Miller: So, well, let’s see if we can do this over the cellular network, because then not only can you get from far away, but everyone will be...

Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle 3: Uconnect Payloads

Charlie and Chris demonstrate what can be remotely done to a modern vehicle’s HVAC and infotainment system through deploying payloads on the head unit. Charlie Miller: So, we used a protocol called Dfeet, which we’ll show you in a second. What it looks like is it’s a cool GUI. And then, when we wrote...

Remove TeslaCrypt ransomware and recover encrypted .vvv/.ccc files

Neither TeslaCrypt nor its copycat AlphaCrypt ransomware is new on the cybercrime arena. In fact, this infection first surfaced in early spring 2015, and it has undergone eight updates over the course of the year. The rather frequent iterations haven’t introduced substantial changes to the trojan’s code...

Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle 2: Connecting to the WPA2 Network

The researchers touch upon jailbreaking the Uconnect and shift the focus to attacking the Jeep’s head unit over Wi-Fi, in particular the hurdles along the way. Chris Valasek: Real quick – jailbreak (see right-hand image). Charlie gave you a teaser last year during the talk. It was a great way for us to...

Reason Core Security review

$24.95 Reason Core Security is all about simplicity combined with solid protection against malware. Usability:  Features:  Efficiency:  Support:  Overall:  Download For a security solution to be efficient, it does not necessarily have to be heavyweight and feature-abundant....

Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle

Twitter’s Charlie Miller and IOActive’s Chris Valasek present their research on the buzz topic of remotely hacking into the controls of the modern vehicles. Chris Valasek: I don’t know if we need introductions anymore. I’m Chris Valasek, Director of Vehicle Security Research at IOActive, and next to...

I will kill you 4: Creating the Shelf baby

Chris Rock focuses on virtual birthing here, describing a way to create a nonexistent baby, which is a new identity that can be used to one’s advantage. Okay, I’ve been given the wrap-up, so I’m going to go through this quickly. Now that we’ve killed somebody, what about birthing? It’s nearly the...

I will kill you 3: Workflow of a virtual kill

Becoming a funeral director, registering a fake death online and then getting access to someone’s funds are perfectly feasible tasks, Chris Rock argues. Instead of doing the fraudulent case of a funeral director, I actually thought it would be fun to find out how to become a funeral director myself (see...

Remove Ads by DNS Unlocker adware

The controversial story of DNS Unlocker software got a kick-off into the public realm with a thread created on VIDCreek.tv online sharing community. In early June 2015, the site admin announced a project purportedly intended for bypassing filters which restrict user access to a variety of Internet resources...

I will kill you. Part 2: Accessing EDRS

After the introduction, Chris Rock demonstrates how easy it is for a hacker to access and manipulate the Electronic Death Registration System. How does a doctor get access to EDRS, or how does a hacker get access to EDRS? Here is a form that the doctor will fill out (see right-hand image), with the obvious...

Chris Rock – I will kill you

In the course of his DefCon 23 presentation, Australian security expert Chris Rock demonstrates how fake death or birth records can be created these days. DefCon host: When I was going through the schedule trying to see what speakers we’re going to be watching, I saw this description and said “Oh yeah, I...

No Budget Threat Intelligence 6: Defensive Strategies

As this ShmooCon presentation is coming to an end, Andrew Morris dwells on defenses against the attacks and shares his plans regarding the upcoming projects. Defensive Strategies So, a couple of defensive strategies (see right-hand image). It’s, basically, standard threat intelligence stuff, whatever you...

No Budget Threat Intelligence 5: Automation

Andrew Morris presents his automated threat reporting system called the Animus and the interactive Threatbot tool powered by the existing attacker database. Threat Reporting Automation So, now I’m going to talk about automating a lot of the stuff that I have been talking about so far. There’s this thing...

No Budget Threat Intelligence 4: Reversing Malware Samples

Having deliberately exposed a honeypot machine to attackers, Andrew Morris got a lot of incoming malware data, which he then reversed to get a better insight. Reversing these samples (see right-hand image) is a talk in and of itself. Actually, it’s reverse engineering the malware samples that you find....

No Budget Threat Intelligence 3: Discovery and Investigation

Andrew Morris has got some great points on the vulnerabilities prevalently used by remote attackers on the Internet, so read this part to learn what those are. Discovery & Investigation We are now going to talk about discovery and investigation. Bad guys are still using Shellshock to propagate pretty...

No Budget Threat Intelligence 2: Setting up Cheap Honeypots

A brief overview of threat intelligence infrastructure, where Andrew Morris focuses on tools for making honeypots that do not require a bunch of resources. Infrastructure (TL;DR) So, again, the tl;dr of infrastructure – we are going to talk about honeypots briefly. Raise your hand if you know what a...

No Budget Threat Intelligence – Tracking Malware Campaigns on the Cheap

Andrew Morris, formerly an Intrepidus Group employee and currently researcher at Endgame, proves at ShmooCon that threat intel doesn’t have to be expensive. Andrew Morris: So, this is “No Budget Threat Intelligence – Tracking Malware Campaigns on the Cheap”. First of all, thank you guys...

Securing our future 4: Governmental malware

As per Mikko Hyppönen’s contemplations, nation states have been coining the most advanced samples of malicious software, so read this follow-up to learn more. I suppose the biggest surprise, to me personally, over the last 25 years that I have been fighting online attacks is the fact that governments...

Securing our future 3: The Internet of Things

Mikko Hyppönen now shifts the vector of his discourse over to criminal challenges online as well as the dangers of the rapidly progressing Internet of Things. There are criminal things online as well. When we move from privacy problems to security problems, then we end up with practical things like this...

Securing our future 2: Legal infringement of privacy

Judging from targeted ad campaigns on social networks, Mikko Hyppönen argues, these companies know too much about their users, which is a big privacy concern. When you go and look at these services as a customer, you go and buy an ad, you end up in this user interface, for example with Twitter, where you...

Securing our future – Mikko Hyppönen

Mikko Hyppönen, F-Secure’s CRO and security celebrity who needs no introduction, highlights current and emerging concerns caused by ubiquity of the Internet. I am Mikko Hyppönen, and I have spent my life analyzing viruses, tracking hackers, catching online criminals and trying to protect the security...

How not to suck at pen testing 6: Penetration testers code of ethics

Black Hills Information Security’s John Strand lists the essential rules, which are intended to make pen testing more efficient as the industry is moving on. John Strand: The whole gist of this entire presentation is we need to keep moving forward as network pen testers. We need to continue to find new...

Remove CryptoWall 3.0 ransomware and mitigate the file damage

While the individuals behind CryptoWall 3.0 virus remain pinned to the “most wanted” cybercriminals list, their infamous product has been up and running for months on end. Anyone who is unfortunate enough to fall victim to this nasty hoax isn’t very likely to know what RSA-2048 even means before the...

How not to suck at pen testing 5: Hunt teaming

This part is about a really interesting, highly effective take on network penetration testing advocated by John Strand and his colleague Joff Thyer. John Strand: So, let’s talk about trying to find new areas, and that’s kind of where we are going to start tying this up (see right-hand image). We need to...

How not to suck at pen testing 4: Bit9 issues and ISR Evilgrade attacks

John Strand dwells on a few nontrivial vectors applicable for compromising target organization’s IT infrastructure and bypassing technologies like Bit9. Also, there’s data loss prevention. As I said, we’re in the midst of a webcast called “Sacred Cash Cow Tipping”. In information security,...

How not to suck at pen testing 3: Mitigating structural weaknesses

The author of the presentation moves on to express his viewpoint on the correct way of handling structural vulnerabilities found during a security assessment. Another kind of offset one was antivirus. I know that this isn’t leet at all, but a couple of weeks ago we did a webcast called “Sacred Cash Cow...

How not to suck at pen testing 2: Thinking beyond the Reds

Some information security engagements described by John Strand demonstrate that the Criticals in pen test reports are not the only things to look at. A number of years ago Ethan Robish, who was with Black Hills Information Security, was doing a pen test for a customer of ours that had multiple pen tests from...

How not to suck at pen testing – John Strand

John Strand, the owner of Black Hills Information Security, shares his perspective upon what the present-day penetration testing should be like. The name of this presentation is “How not to suck at pen testing”. There’s a lot of presentations that you’ll see where people just rip on the pen...

Adaptive Penetration Testing 8: The Social-Engineer Toolkit Works Wonders

In the closing part of the presentation, Dave Kennedy reviews some cool features of the new version of SET, and Kevin Mitnick demonstrates his famous whistle. Dave: Now I want to go into the Social-Engineer Toolkit 2.1, which is getting released today. I’ll upload it, probably, tonight when I maybe...

Adaptive Penetration Testing 7: Rogue AP and the Blackout Jammer

Kevin Mitnick and Dave Kennedy share two more pentest stories: one involving a rogue certificate and the other one based on exploiting powerline communication. Dave: We have a little bit time left, so Kevin do you want to fly through this one? This is the external and wireless penetration test (see...