Data Mining a Mountain of Zero Day Vulnerabilities 6: Mobile Application Vulnerabilities and Secure Coding

Winding up with his Black Hat presentation, Chris Wysopal dwells on smartphone application vulnerabilities and the issue of assuring secure code development.

Smartphone Application Vulnerabilities

I have a little bit of data here on smartphones. Like I said, we don’t have a lot of data because we just introduced Android and iOS static analysis middle of the last year. And we took the data through the end of the year to do our report on.

Android apps prevalence by industry

Android apps prevalence by industry

So, we have some data on the industry verticals (see chart). I should say that when we do Android applications, these are enterprise Android applications; we’re not going up to the marketplace and pulling down hundreds of apps and just looking through them. It’s something we could do, but we haven’t done that, and if we did that, then we’d get the distribution of what’s in the marketplace, which will be heavily slanted towards things like games, and personal productivity apps, and things like that.

But the apps that we’ve tested are apps that our enterprise customers are either building to give to their customers and partners or employees, or they’re buying. So they’re serving an enterprise purpose.

The breakdown is mostly retail, then technology companies, finance and services, banks, media, healthcare, hospitality. So these are all the different companies that are either buying or building enterprise mobile apps.

Prevalent mobile app vulnerabilities

Prevalent mobile app vulnerabilities

When we looked at them, the number 1 vulnerability was insufficient entropy, which basically just means that no one’s using secure random number generation on Android, they just don’t get the concept or something like that.

This one was really surprising though, it’s hard-coded cryptographic key, because that means if you have possession of the binary, you’re going to have possession of the key, which, I can see how an enterprise developer might think: “Well, it’s connecting to our back-end service and we’re only giving these applications to our employees, so everything’s cool. I can hard-code the cryptographic key.” But, you know, if the phone gets lost, the app gets taken off the phone, then you’re going to lose the key. So that’s always a bad idea to hard-code it, because you can’t change the key easily and there’s a huge amount of people that know the same key.

And we see this in regular Java applications, I think it’s about 18% of the time; we see it on the Java J2EE application. But it’s much worse on the Android, and it’s also much worse because of the threat model, right? You’d have to break in to the application server and be able to read the binary to get a hard-coded key in a web application, but on an Android device you just have to get access to the mobile app, which is widely distributed.

Sometimes developers write apps on purpose to have sensitive data go off the device.

One of the other categories is information exposure through sent data – we saw 39%, because of the threat model of the mobile device, where a lot of big threats are not someone compromising the device through a buffer overflow or SQL injection and things like that, where they would take over the device to get the data. A lot of times the risk is that the app is written insecurely and is leaking data. So it’s leaking sensitive information in the clear, or it’s using sensitive information like the phone number and things like that as IDs and tokens in the way the app is built. So this is all about data that the user of the device doesn’t want sent off the device and it gets sent off.

This is a big emerging area in the mobile world, and it isn’t always that the app is written insecurely; sometimes the developer wrote it on purpose to have sensitive data go off the device, because that was their business model. We saw this big thing with the Path address book.

So, at Veracode we wrote a small app that just did a quick binary grab to see how many apps that you had installed happen to be for iOS, because it’s easier to look into your iTunes directory, and see how many apps you had installed that access the address book. There’s a method that bulk grabs the whole address book at once. And it turned out that we found hundreds of apps that are doing this. So sometimes it’s intentional that that’s going on. Of course, an enterprise purchasing a mobile app doesn’t want their employees’ address books all compromised by the mobile app provider, so that’s why they would be concerned; but individuals should be concerned too.

Assessment of Developers’ Secure Coding Skills

Developers assessment test grades

Developers assessment test grades

So, now I will talk a little bit more about the developers, and how well developers are doing about writing secure apps from an education standpoint. When given an exam on application security fundamentals, over half the developers – what grade do you think they received on the assessment test? How good are the developers in terms of security fundamentals?

Breakdown of scores

Breakdown of scores

It actually turns out to be C. About half get a C or worse here with the application security fundamentals, so that’s the state up here. But you can see the breakdown of scores A, B, C, D, E and F for these different assessment tests (see chart). These are the top 4 assessment tests that we give out. This is a set of about 5000 developers that this data comes from.

Down here are the types of tests that organizations are asking their developers to take. 62% take the application security fundamentals, which is really basic stuff that applies to every language, like theories of least privilege, input validation – those very basic concepts that apply across all languages and platforms.

And then we have tests like secure coding for .NET, which is .NET’s specific issues – the .NET APIs for Java, and Intro to cryptography. And it’s interesting that developers actually do pretty well in cryptography, and if you ask a developer if they learned security at school, they say: “Yeah, I learned security at school; I took a course on cryptography.”

So cryptography is actually taught at the collegiate level, and so a lot of developers, more than a half of them, got an A or a B; actually, almost half got an A on crypto concepts, which again, I think, shows that if you educate the developers, they’ll actually know what they’re doing.

If you look at security fundamentals, developers actually fare the worst.

But if you look at security fundamentals, which you think are the really basic things that we all know about building secure systems, developers actually fare the worst. They don’t really understand concepts like least privilege, attack surface reduction, and things like that.

And then another difference here that is interesting – the secure coding for .NET did a little bit better than secure coding for Java. A and B come to 66% versus 52% here, so that seems significant to me, and my theory there is – and I’ve looked at the .NET documentation – it talks a lot about using the security features, things like outputting coding and input validation, and it’s right there in the .NET documentation. So I think just by learning how to use, learning how to code in .NET, the developers absorb some secure coding concepts, while that’s just not happening with the Java developers.

Security quality score vs. test score

Security quality score vs. test score

Then we took a look at whether we can correlate the test scores that the developers on the particular development team got with the security quality score that we generated for that application (see graph).

And it turns out that it doesn’t really correlate very well. So we were hoping to see that people that did well on the tests, so they knew about secure coding, actually wrote more secure apps, which would show a nice trend line here, right? But it looks like it’s spread all over the place.

So I think we need to do a better job isolating our data. One of the problems is a developer could take a test and then join the development team that has written bad code for 10 years, and he’s on that team now; he might be writing good code, but there’s such an amount of bad code, and it’s hard to isolate that.

So, what we really need to do is look at pieces of code that were written by a particular developer, and we can’t just conflate teams and applications together. That’s something I’d like to work on to actually show the value of education, because, you know, intuitively it makes sense, right? But I don’t think anyone has empirically shown that it makes a significant difference.

A lot of companies are spending money to train all their developers, hoping that there will be an effect. And I hear a lot of people say: “I’m doing an AppSec program, the first thing we’re going to do is we’re going to train our developers.” I hear that probably half the time. And I say: “Really, what you should be doing is testing, because then you put in a verification, you’re putting in an enforcement mechanism that’s going to force you to remediate things. But then you need a policy and hold your developers accountable to do something; and that’s harder to do than offer training.”

So, besides this interesting math problem here, that was all I had for data.

Read previous: Data Mining a Mountain of Zero Day Vulnerabilities 5: Code Security Assessment

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